Iran Affairs

Trita Parsi's reply to Leverett's critique of "A Single Roll of the Dice"

As an update to my previous post on this topic:

Trita Parsi has replied  to the critique published in the Boston Review by the Leveretts of his book, "A Single Roll of the Dice" (which I still have not had time to read myself though I definitely mean to.)

I must say I'm disappointed in Trita's response to the Leverett's critique. Sure, perhaps the Leveretts really were out of line in implying (as some think) that Trita was a crypto-Neocon who favoured a war with Iran. I certainly don't believe that myself. But these sorts of things should not be used by Trita as an excuse to basically refuse to acknowledge and respond to the substantive charges raised by the Leveretts in their critique of his book.

Take for example the Leverett's objection to Trita's continued assertion that the 2009 elections in Iran were "fraudulent". Rather than responding to this, Trita simply demurs and instead characterizes the whole issue as "peripheral", even though he also writes that the the book was about Obama's reaction to the "election scandal" Iran:

Their assessment of the book seems to be based on their disagreements with my analysis on two points, one central and one peripheral to my thesis. First, the peripheral point: The Leveretts are stalwart proponents of the idea that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad won the 2009 elections fair and square...

The book does not try to resolve this debate. Rather, it focuses on how the Obama administration reacted to the developments in Iran and vice versa, as well as how the election scandal and the subsequent human rights abuses (which are undisputable) affected the Obama administration’s Iran policy, its calculations, and its political space and maneuverability.

Well, wait a minute now. If there was no election fraud, then what "scandal" are we talking about? Wouldn't any analysis of Obama's reaction depend a great deal on the nature of those very same elections? After all, if there was no fraud (and no one has provided any actual evidence for it) then that really puts a different spin on those post-election riotors, doesn't it? Rather than wronged pro-democracy voters as who simply wanted to have their votes counted (as portrayed in the Western media), they become a minority of agent provocateurs who sought to overturn the results of a valid election through force and intimidation, don't they? More broadly and fundamentally, it makes a big difference in the fundamental legitimacy of the Ahmadinejad presidency as well as the regime as a whole -- something which definitely CANNOT be viewed as merely "peripheral" to Obama's Iran policy.

It seems to me that Trita is trying to have it both ways, and unfortunately this is a debating tactic I've also seen employed by many of the other "Greens" -- they at once refuse to debate the question of whether there was fraud in the elections, while insisting that there was fraud,  and yet also insist that the elections are proof of the unpopularity of the regime. Isn't this exactly the same "agenda-driven analysis" that Trita accuses the Leveretts of promoting?

So, I have to agree with the Leverett's rejoinder to Parsi on this point:

Confronting unsubstantiated claims about a “fraudulent” election gets to the foundations of the case for regime change—which, whether represented by hard militarists like John Bolton or soft regime change advocates like Trita Parsi and Scott Lucas, is ultimately what gets the United States into Middle Eastern wars.  This is the same dangerous convergence of the neoconservative right with liberal human rights advocates that enabled the Iraq war. 

And I have to also say that I'm a bit personally confused about Trita's response to the Leveretts on this point of the election fraud because on our FaceBook discussion, Trita told me that he "pointed to supporting evidence [of election fraud] in the book" -- a definite reason why I was keen to read it in the first place.

[My disappointment is doubled because I was similarly told that Ali Ansari's book on the elections, Crisis of Authority, would provide the proof of election fraud but when I bought and read it, that was obviously not the case. The closest Ansari came to providing any "proof" fraud was in claiming that some pro-Ahmadinejad cleric had encouraged people to vote for Ahmadinejad. And that's just not fraud, sorry, especially when some 40% of the voters apparently didn't feel particularly convinced or compelled to vote for Ahmadinejad.]

So in short, I'm sorry but Trita's response that "there will be endless debate about this", is simply not an adequate answer to the Leverett's point.

And as for the second point -- the Leverett's view that Obama was never really interested in engaging Iran but merely engaged in a ploy intended to justify further sanctions and coercion -- the two sides are actually essentially in agreement though Trita is starts out being dismissive of the Leverett's point:

It is not clear whether the Leveretts’ position is a conclusion or an assumption. Either way, they do not present any evidence (no need for a smoking gun here, it seems) to support their contention beyond some of the writings of Dennis Ross prior to his entering the Obama administration, and the fact that the Obama White House did not emulate Richard Nixon’s tactics when he went to China.

Well, I'm not sure that the job of the Leveretts in writing the review is to present detailed "evidence" -- this is after all a review, not a separate book, and anyone who has read their work is quite familiar with their argument. And, in any case, the Leveretts are hardly the only ones who apparently think that Obama was disingenuous in his "outreach" to Iran. I certainly think so, for whatever that's worth, and for example apparently so does veteran Iran observer Gary Sick:

The only conclusion I can draw from this is that Obama was never sincere about his engagement strategy. It has yet to be tried.

Frankly I don't think anyone who is familiar with the history of the jostling surrounding Iran-US relations can conclude otherwise. If you doubt this, take a look at the many instances in which the US has condemned Iran for its "intransigence" to "negotiate meaningfully" of its nuclear program due to the imposition of "preconditions"  -- negotiations which the US itself saddled with poison pills and precondition of the indefinite suspension of uranium enrichment in Iran.

But to his credit, Trita himself seems to agree with the Leveretts on this point -- that the engagement was not genuine. His only real difference in opinion seems to be in that he attributes this to...

a much more complex picture in which the president’s vision was consistently compromised by opposition from within his own cabinet; by pressure from Israel, Saudi Arabia, lobbyists, and Congress; and by the actions of the Iranian government. All this combined with the administration’s unwillingness to fight for political space. It is this process that I describe in the book.

I can certainly see that (which is why I'm still buying the book though I don't expect the election fraud issue to be resolved)  and I think the Leveretts would agree with this too. After all, I don't think the Leveretts are of the opinion that the disingenuousness of the purported engagement was ONLY attributable to a PERSONAL distaste or dislike of engagement by Obama himself. Naturally, this is policy that has a variety of causes. Nevertheless, that was indeed the policy - to attempt to engage, but not really.(Incidentally, nor can the appointment of Dennis Ross be dismissed as irrelevant in creating this policy.)

The bottom line is that that Obama's outreach to Iran - for whatever reason - was cynical, and expected or even perhaps intended to fail. Thus, the argument now made by the hawks (that diplomacy and engagement was "tried" by was "rebuffed" by Iran) is simply not true. And in that, there is simply no question. After all, there is by now simply no doubt whatsoever that the the US and the Obama administration are not interested in any sort of peaceful resolution to the Iran nuclear standoff or compromise with Iran, but are instead out for regime change.

So in short, it seems to me that the Leveretts and Trita Parsi agree on more than they think. And what they agree on, is rather important.

Pollack, Gelb feign restraint on Iran

I've often written how in the aftermath of the "WMDs in Iraq" fiasco, not a single one of the talking heads who so cravenly promoted the lie to justify the invasion of Iraq was ever held to account. I suppose that's why Leslie Gelb of the Council of Foreign Relations feels free to now admit that he supported the Iraq war due to personal career concerns:

My initial support for the war [in Iraq] was symptomatic of unfortunate tendencies within the foreign policy community, namely the disposition and incentives to support wars to retain political and professional credibility. We 'experts' have a lot to fix about ourselves, even as we 'perfect' the media. We must redouble our commitment to independent thought, and embrace, rather than cast aside, opinions and facts that blow the common—often wrong—wisdom apart. Our democracy requires nothing less.

And yet these same sorts of "experts" insist on portraying Iran policy as a false choice between bombing/sanctioning Iran or Iran "going nuclear" (ignoring the substantial and significant diffrence between "nuclear capability" and nuclear weapons) as well as the host of intermediate options that would not necessarily involve Iran getting the bomb or getting bombed -- for example by recognizing Iran's right to enrich uranium in peace and under IAEA safeguards as it is doing now.

The most recent example of this false choice which is being promoted to a "social fact" through constant repetition can be seen in an recent article in Foreign Affairs, entitled "The Dangers of a Nuclear Iran" by Edelman & Krepinevich (see image)

Once they box the US into thinking that the only options are bombing Iran, or Iran "gets the bomb" then it become oh so much easier to convince the US to bomb Iran, after all. This, despite the fact that even the Israelis themselves quitely conceed that Iran is not making nukes, and that Iranian nukes would not pose an "existential threat" to Israel anyway.

Even Leslie Gelb seems to be waivering on the overheated chest thumping towards Iran coming out of Washington, nevermind that he is/was part of the same pro-Israeli propaganda apparatus whose job is to scarmonger about Iran.

And ironically, Ken Pollack has written an article entitled "Are we sliding towards a war with Iran" in which he frets that the current policies could lead to an "inadvertent" war:

Thus, if we continue down this path, we had best be ready to walk it to its very end. And if we don’t have the stomach to countenance the possibility of such an escalation, we may want to reconsider our current course.

"Reconsider our current course"?? This is a rather ironic statement, coming from someone who was a strong proponent, if not contributing architect of the policies which have brought us the current mess with Iran. After all, it wasn't so long ago that Pollack argued that the the US should "double down" on a policy of sanctions and threats directed against Iran, even though he acknowledged that the policy had not succeeded, had no real prospects of success, and could only lead to...you guessed it!... a false choice between bombing Iran or Iran getting the bomb:

IN THE end, all this may fail. With its hard-liners firmly in charge, Tehran may choose further suffering, isolation and weakness rather than give up its nuclear program. If so, the United States will then face a choice between military operations and a containment strategy meant to limit or prevent a nuclear Iran from making mischief beyond its borders until the regime finally collapses from its own dysfunctions.

In short, the guy who is pushing quite ADVERTENTLY for war (is advertently a word?) pretends to care about an "inadvertent" slide towards the same end.

Seems like the rats know the ship is sinking and are trying to distance themselves. After all, wouldn't want to damage any "political and professional credibility."

My latest FAIR CounterSpin interview

I've been so busy I forgot to post this:

CounterSpin (1/13/12-1/19/12)

Listen: [mp3] [RealAudio not avalailable]

This week on CounterSpin: As a covert war against Iran seems to be intensifying, the U.S. media have looked like willing partners in an anti-Iran propaganda campaign, helping US officials project dishonest claims, rs. We'll speak with Cyrus Safdari of Iran Affairs about coverage.

Review of Trita Parsi's book, "A Single Role of the Dice."

Actually, this isn't really my review - I have been too busy to get the book and read it though I've promised myself I will. I certainly enjoyed Dr Parsi's first book, Treacherous Alliances.

Rather, this is a comment or two on the Leveretts' detailed and quite substantial review of Parsi's book published recently in the Boston Review. And I have to say  I am in vehement agreement with the Leveretts' criticisms of NIAC and Parsi on their two main points.

It is ironic that the centerpiece of their criticism of Parsi's book is his apparent continued insistence on the existence of fraud in Iran's 2009 elections -- and all the implications from that, which the Leveretts point out -- because that was also a point I raised earlier today with Parsi on Facebook, in a comment I posted on his "wall" regarding an article he's written in which he casually repeats the claim that the elections were "fraudulent" (not even "allegedly" so, though he acknowledges the existence of a debate on this point.)

As regular readers of my blog know, I and others have already written extensively on the question of whether there is any actual evidence of election fraud, so I won't bother rehashing the points and debunking the fraud claims yet again. I also won't bother rehashing the point that there was no particular need or reason for any election fraud to happen (short version: Mousavi was a regime-insider backed by a clerical founder of the Islamic Republic and was also specifically vetted and pre-cleared to run for office by the same regime that supposedly felt so threatened by his supposed election victory that it supposedly resorted to massive election fraud to keep him out of office...? Bullshit.) So I have to say that I agree with the Leveretts that Parsi's insistence of claiming that the elections were fraudulent taints his writings on Iran (though, again, I haven't read his latest book.)

Another point the Leveretts make is about NIAC's promotion of sanctions on Iran, ostensibly for human rights reasons. As readers of this blog know, I also have also had a long-standing disagreement with the National Iranian-American Council on this point. As I've mentioned before, this doesn't make me an opponent to human rights. Rather, my views on this point are due to the fact that I think any contribution to the sanctions regime on Iran, even ostensibly for "human rights" reasons, only exacerbates the actual human rights situation there, futher politicizes the issue of human rights and thus discredits it as merely a tool in the apparatus of US domination, and only adds to the obstacles in the way of the one thing that can actually improve human rights in Iran: an improvement of US-Iran relations that entails rapprochement, engagement, the removal of sanctions which can lead to the creation of an economically stable, secure middle class in Iran. Indeed, more sanctions  are not just going to fail in "fixing" Iran's human rights situation, they can only add to the momentum for war which (ironically) as Parsi himself has written, can overtake the contrary personal views and intentions of the politicians and policy-makers.

In short, if you really care about human rights in Iran as well as avoiding a war, you should be arguing for engagement instead of more sanctions. Or, to quote the Leveretts:

To avoid the very war that Parsi says he opposes, the United States will have to pursue a rapprochment with the Islamic Republic as it is, not as some -- including, it would seem, Trita Parsi -- wish it to be.

On a final note: for full disclosure purposes, I should mention that I've known Trita for many years (before he was all rich 'n famous) and I have absolutely no doubt that running an organization like NIAC is tough and requires making compromises and charting courses between often equally unappetizing options. I don't doubt for a moment that Parsi and the staff and NIAC genuinely oppose any US war on Iran, and I do believe that the NIAC and Parsi make valuable contributions -- very valuable contributions -- to the debate over US-Iran relations, but naturally not everyone is going to agree with everyone else's positions on all matters. 

 

 

 

Claims of "Iranian soldiers captured in Syria" debunked.

After the fiasco of the "Syrian Gay blogger",  I guess some people aren't done trying to push propaganda about Syria.

Turns out that the claims (mostly by Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya) about Iranian revolutionary guards being captured by the "rebels" in Syria is a load of bullshit. In summary:

1- The pictures shown match the Iranian engineers abducted over a month ago in Syria rather than "revolutionar guards."

2- Reason to forcing and make them to change clothes and wear black clothes is to make them appear more like Hezbollah members or IRGC members.

3- A rifle is placed in between them to make them look like fighters; why they should be seating next to a rifle when confessing on their aged crimes.

4- The claims about a "lack of visas" and secretly entering Syria is funny, considering that Iran and Syria removed visas requirements for travel over a year go.

5- A funny part was showing the abductees passports, why should members of Hezbollah and IRGC if on a secret mission in Syria or anywhere else should or would carry passport and indemnification of any kind with them. Specially deploying forces that apparently can’t even speak the local language and need translators.

6- Is the claim that since their passports was signed by an police officer then they are members of military. All Iranian passports are signed and stamped by chief of policy or his deputy.

Israel & US media pushing US into war on Iran

MJ Rosenberg says what I've been saying all along:

Bottom line: The purpose of these articles [about an imminent Israeli attack on Iran] is not to predict an Israeli attack but to force the United States government into piling on sanction after sanction (with war always an option) rather than pursue a diplomatic solution to the crisis.

It makes no sense. And yet, due to the pressure of the pro-war lobby, it is diplomacy that is barely on the table, while war, always the direst option, is front and center.

Yup. And their goal?

Sanctions up to a point. War, if deemed necessary, farther down the road. And ideally a war fought by the United States and not Israel, to preserve not Israel's security but its regional hegemony.

If the American people allow that to happen, we are truly out of our minds.

So I guess we'll see. But the Leveretts don't sound too optimistic about the chances that Obama can break the AIPAC death grip on US foriegn policy:

The case for serious U.S. diplomacy with Iran could not be clearer.  But seriousness, in this context, will require very significant changes in U.S. policy and Washington’s overarching attitude about the Islamic Republic.  We hope that we are wrong, but we do not think it likely that the Obama Administration will be up for this, especially not at the President continues his re-election bid. 

Zionist Iran-basher under investigation by FBI

Turns out that Sheldon Adelson, the billionaire casino boss and funder of extreme rightwing lunacy as well as a supporter of war on Iran and backer of US presidential candidate Gingrich, is under investigation for associating with the Chinese mob in his casino deals over in Macau. I wonder if this will have any effect on his funding and promoting war on Iran and Israeli expansionism...not that the New York Times would mention any of that.

Boy history has a way of repeating itself.

EU talks with Iran are a national insult.

This is the text of EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton's letter to Iran, inviting Iran to talks with the EU. Note that while it demands that Iran impose no "preconditions" on the talks, it hides its own demands and preconditions in diplomatic language:

In order to start such a process, our initial objective is to engage in a confidence building exercise aimed at facilitating a constructive dialogue on the basis of reciprocity and a step-by-step approach. In this regard, we remain committed to the practical and specific suggestions which we have put forward in the past…involving full implementation by Iran of UNSC and IAEA Board of Governor’s resolutions

In other words, Iran has to give up enrichment, initially and as a "confidence building measure", before there can be negotiations about the enrichment program.

Frankly, his letter amounts to a national insult.

And that's why I agree with B at MoonofAlabama that the talks are actually intended to fail. The goal of setting such preconditions is to blame the failure of the talks on Iran's "intransigence".

Keller on "How about not bombing Iran"

Bill Keller has an article in the NY Times entitled "How about not bombing Iran" in which he makes some suggestions for a way out of the current US-Iran nuclear impasse.

While insisting on portraying Iran as having engaged in bad faith negotiations, he recommends that the US stop insisting on "zero enrichment" in Iran.

He mentions that Iran has offered to cease 20% enrichment,

The State Department was dismissive – and again, it’s hard to fault them for taking what the Iranians say as bluff and diversion – but given the added menace of 20 percent enrichment, the White House ought to be looking for a way to test that offer.

What Keller doesn't ask is why the State Department was dismissive, nor does he ask why the US continues to insist on zero enrichment -- because this was hardly the first time that Iran made a significant compromise offers that were ignored or even deliberately torpedoed.

Keller then makes a list of ways out -- which consist of Iran making compromises -- not realizing that practically everything he's listed was offered by Iran already.

Keller and other analysts don't want to come to grips with the fact that this standoff is not really about nuclear weapons, and so no solution can be found in any compromises over the nuclear issue. The nuclear standoff with Iran has always been about justifying regime change in Iran. The last thing the US wants is to let the nuclear issue be resolved peacefully, thus depriving it of the excuse for regime change policies.

The Iran hawks try to justify a war, as did the discredited Iraq hawks a decade ago

I've been sort of quite busy lately so any update to this blog will have to be quick and dirty, but there's so much to cover and I'm not sure where to start. I'm hoping more of my regular visitors and commentators will use the open comments on this blog to add their own updates on what's going on in US-Iran relations

Of course, we have to start with the recent assassination of an Iranian nuclear scientist -- 32-year old Mostafa Ahmadi Roshan, who was in fact merely a procurement officer at Natanz, which happens to be a completely civilian uranium enrichment facility that is under constant IAEA monitoring. This forms a pattern: everytime the P5+1 are about to enter negotiations, a nuclear scientist is murdered. I suppose the message is that whoever is responsible will not tolerate a negotiated settlement to the nuclear standoff, but in effect they're shooting themselves in the foot. The openly-expressed glee by Santorum and the Israelis only serve to exacerbate the sense of revulsion even in the West at such tactics and portray Iran as the victim, nevermind to mention the nationalistic outrage by the people in Iran who naturally view such actions as a sign of vindictiveness and desire to keep Iran subservient. No wonder a thousand Iranian college students have reportedly switched their major to nuclear science.

Second, I recommend reading B's post over at Moon of Alabama, where he points out that the current P5+1 negotiations with Iran have already been killed by US preconditions -- in this case that Iran simply hand over its enriched uranium for nothing -- which is quite normal and usual since the last thing the US wants is for the negotiations to actually succeed and thus deprive the US of the "nuclear weapons threat" justification for its regime-change policies.

Third, Mark Perry has a sensational piece accusing Israel of arming of the Baluchi Jundallah terrorist group in Eastern Iran. According to Perry, Israeli Mossad agents posed as American spies to recruit members of the terrorist organization Jundallah, and have consistently ignored US objections at portraying themselves as CIA officers. Of course there's speculation that Perry is actually trying to disassociate the real US policies by blaming them on Israel. Frankly, I don't care. Makes very little difference whether the Israelis are doing this with the open  connivance of the US, or merely the silent toleration of the US, because in the end the result is the same.

Then we have a series of "experts" writing a variety of articles in which they seek to justify a war on Iran.  Kroenig wrote in Foreign Policy that  bombing Iran's nuclear facilities would be the "least bad option." Fly and Schmidt further suggest that not only should the US bomb Iran's nuclear facilities, but should engage in a prolonged battle to totally topple the regime -- a policy they refer to as "Go Big then Go Home."

There are enough analysts who have pointed out that this sort of argument sounds a lot like the bullshit that the NeoCons promoted to justify the invasion of Iraq -- including the claims that the people of Iran would would direct their resentments towards the regime rather than the US, and would welcome such an attack (remember, the Iraqis were going to toss flowers at invading US troops.) How exactly is the US realistically going to "go home" after launching a war on Iran, considering that it has just now managed to extricate itself from the mess it created in smaller, weaker Iraq almost a decade after the initial invasion, is left to the imagination. 

Also, I suppose it is a sign of the times and NeoCon thinking no one bothers to ask themselves how things have gotten so bad that launching a war is considered to be a preferable course of affairs, but in any case all three writers' arguments rely on framing the issue as a false choice: either Iran should be bombed, or Iran will acquire the bomb. I've written about this false choice before, since it is a common "talking point" by the NeoCons as it conveniently ignores a whole range of intermediate options between the two extremes, and is thus intended to ultimately corner the US into bombing Iran.  The idea of engagement -- a real engagement, not the pretense we've witnessed thus far -- is naturally left out. As I've written before, as far as the NeoCons are concerned, their real ambition it to prevent a US-Iran engagement and topple the regime, not just to end any supposed "nuclear weapons threat" from Iran.

I also recommend reading Gareth Porter's explanation on why Hillary Clinton's claim that the Fordow nuclear enrichment facility in Iran was supposedly a "secret" is false -- and also Eric Brill's debunking of torture-supporting John Yoo's justification of an attack on Iran -- and Pepe Escobar's rather funny article on how the myth of an "isolated" of Iran.

Clawson: need a false flag operation to justify a war against Iran

Perhaps its the amatuer psychologist in me, but the following statement by Patrick Clawson of the pro-Israeli WINEP think tank quite telling:

"It's a lot better to have a fight" that Iran provokes, Clawson replied, before adding: "Better to enter World War II after Pearl Harbor, and World War I after the sinking of the Lusitania."

This was his reponse to a question about why the sanctions on Iran's nuclear program has not thus far succeeded. He's not even making an attempt to hide the fact that they're using the nuclear issue as a pretext to launch a war.They're just hoping for a way to blame it on Iran.

I like this Maloney quote:

Washington's "embrace of open-ended pressure means" the United States has effectively backed itself into a dead-end "policy of regime change," Maloney continued.

That's not accidental, Suzanne. That was the plan all along. That's why Clawson leaves out a third option: engagement

Vindication at last

So you beat your head against a wall for a while, until one day you wake up and the world now agrees with you.

Today on Juan Cole's site, I read this, and my heart jumped:

The sanctions regime on Iran is not even primarily about the civilian nuclear enrichment program (to which Iran has a right under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty), but about causing the regime to collapse.

Oh my god - it took years but finally people are starting to get it.

I've been saying for a very long time now, the US sanctions on Iran are not really about nuclear weapons.  The "Iranian nuclear weapons threat" thing is just a pretext - like "WMDs in Iraq". The actual policy is about causing regime change in Iran, not just ending any "nulcear weapons threat" -- and so, logically, no amount of Iranian compromise offers on the nuclear issue will ever suffice. The US does not want the nuclear issue resolved, not without removing the regime as well. This explains why, for years, multiple Iranian compromise offers that would have addressed any REAL concerns about weapons proliferation, were simply ignored or actively undermined by the US.

So please folks, the next time the articles casually claim that the sanctions are attributable to the nuclear program, lets not let that slip into our consciousness through repetition. No, lets assert back, that the sanctions are intended to cause regime change.

What can the US offer Iran in any kind of nuclear deal?

Sweet! The Washington Post let the cat out of the bag when it reported that the goal of the US sanctions on Iran is regime change and not preventing nuclear weapons proliferation, and Panetta stated that Iran isn't actually trying to make nukes. Of course, someone then decided to press the Washington Post to issue a "correction" denying that the goal of the policy is regime change, and Panetta's people were quick to try to restate what he had stated... All, of course, quite familiar scenes to anyone who had been following the Iran-US relations close enough had already "discovered" the fact that the conflict was never really about nuclear weapons at all.

This, and the news that both the New York Times and the Washington Post were sufficiently inundated by reader pressure that they decided to "correct" their prior headlines which had falsely claimed that the IAEA had concluded that Iran was making nukes... and today was a good day. It shows that people are starting to pay attention to the small details that make a big difference.

I was going to start out writing about Olli H.'s (sorry I can't look up the spelling right now) interview in the Guardian, where he suggests a possible compromise of the US-Iran nuclear standoff. He recommends:

Here's a thought: The P5+1 could provide modern, safe and secure nuclear technology, fuel for the TRR and in the longer term, a more efficient research reactor. Iran could in turn relinquish its stock of enriched uranium.

Here's a thought, Olli: Iran already tried this. It was ignored like all of the rest of Iran's compromise offers. And here's another thought: why do you assume that the answer to what is essentially a political dispute can be found in a nuclear compromise? That's not where the answer lies, because that's not where the problem is - the problem between the US and Iran is first and foremost political. The nuclear issue is just a pretext, a cover for a political dispute.

And by know it should be obviously clear to anyone who has followed the history, that the goal of the political process now in force, is justifying imposing regime change in Iran even if by war. Nuclear weapons are just a pretext, the US has no intention of allowing this pretext to be taken away from it, and the last thing the US wants is to resolve the nuclear dispute with the regime there still in power.

Anyway, but then I read this article which features a few quotes from Trita Parsi (whose new book I have sadly thus far failed to acquire but definitely will do so soon) in which he asks a rather interesting question:

The United States wants Iran to stop enrichment to 20 percent, to turn over its stockpile of low enriched uranium, and to halt plans to make Fordo operational. "But what can they and the Europeans" offer in return? asked Parsi...

I had never thought of that question, really. What can they offer in return? I had never asked the question. OK, having established that the US is deliberately on a collision course with Iran of its own making, or more specifically, the makings of the lobbyists for Israel, what other option could the US pursue?

Naturally, until now I would have tossed out the list things that the Iranians would potentially want in return. They would want the sanctions lifted, trade normalized, an end to the ideas of fomenting a "Color Revolution" in Iran, etc. This would have seemed a self-evident list, requiring no more thought than needed to rattle it off. But then Trita's question made me wonder: what can the US offer, realistically speaking.

Here's what I'm wondering:

Is the US in a position to be able to actually offer anything to Iran which could make it worthwhile for Iran to abandon all or at least a significant chunk of its nuclear program?

And, if no - is the US on a path to confrontation with Iran because isn't capable of pursuing a different policy primarily and simply due to domestic constraints?

And it occurred to me that in reality no one in the US can offer anything that Iran would logically and presumably ask for. For example, on the question of removal of sanctions: Can Obama actually remove the sanctions? He has the legal authority to rescind some Executive Orders, of course, but that is only a small part of the web of sanctions imposed around Iran. He would have to go up against the US Congress, which as that Tom Friedman character recently said, is "bought and paid for" by Israel. So how would these sanctions be removed, exactly? How could the State Department actually get Adelson to stop funding think tanks that hire PhDs as advocates acting under a guise of scholarly objectivity to promote the idea that giving up on sanctions amounts to Chamberlain bowing to Hitler? How could Obama get editors to stop or start using keywords and phrases over and over again in their publications, "Nuclear Weapons Program", "Terrorism", etc.? How could he do any of this, even if he didn't have to worry about getting re-elected, because after all he can't do anything unless he's re-elected.

So the truth of the matter is that we are going to be in this "holding pattern" for a while until something changes that allows a change in US domestic political considerations with respect to Mideast policy. And that, first and foremost, means a resolution to not only the Israeli-Palestinian situation, and the role of Israel in shaping US foreign policy. In short, no time soon. Resolving the Iran-US issue - and I mean really resolving it - is going to require some fundamental, ground-shaking change: Something that fundamentally realigns the world's and domestic power structures. And until that happens we're going to continue seeing what happens when two countries butt heads for another decade, each time getting perilously closer to outright hostilities.

So, am I right? Assuming that Washington wants to resolve things with Iran peacefully and is willing to make the necessary compromises to do so, IS anyone in Washington really in a position to deliver on such promises and to implement such policies in the face of domestic opposition, where being 'weak on Iran' is blood in the water for the opposing campaign? To sell any sort of real change in Iran policy to the public, or at least those who pay for his election campaigning, the President would have to be willing to consume a great deal of political capital. Can he get the necessary laws passed, and other laws rescinding? How many votes in Congress would that require? How much fighting will be required for each vote? Its just not possible. No politician in the US can do this. Even assuming he could win some of the fights, it would consume far more resources than any politician can be willing to dedicate to a single cause.

Sorry, I don't see this happening. And, unlike others, I don't think that mass domestic public opinion can act as a counter-balance to the Israeli pressure for confrontation. Yes, Ron Paul's statements about the role of the US military in the Mideast may have had a popular response, but that's a vague, out of focus, visceral, feel-good response from public opinion that can be easily manipulated. It is not the sort of sentiment that gets translated into power and which can actually shape policy. Ron Paul, in short, is going to go away as simply a grumpy old man.

So, the US is simply not in a position to deliver on any potential offers to Iran that would be worth it for Iran to give in to US demands. And so the holding pattern continues, threats and noise but no overt conflict, though it appears to be more and more inevitable as the holding pattern degrades and falls apart.

 

 

CNN censors Ron Paul voter's interview regarding Iran war?

Just four minutes ago as I was watching the CNN coverage of the Republican caucus in Iowa they interviewed a US soldier wearing fatigues who was identified as a Ron Paul voter. He was speaking about how he supported Ron Paul's message of bringing the troops home, and seemed to be saying that picking new fights with Iran was wrong and that Israel can defend itself...when he was cut off and there was an unexplained technical problem. LOL! I wish someone had recorded this!

UPDATE: Thanks to kind commentators:

 

 

Iran Hawk Watch

In response to a worrying trend in U.S. politics Lobe Log is launching “Iran Hawk Watch”. Each Friday we will post on militaristic commentary about Iran from a variety of sources including news articles, think tanks and pundits.

Paul Pillar gets it

I recommend reading Paul Pillar's posts at the National Interest, especially this one:

Some in this country—including some who have been most responsible for stoking the atmosphere just described—probably do not want sanctions to work. They instead see them as a necessary preliminary to the war that they really want.

Yes. Precisely.

Civilians = Bugs

The more I read and blog about US and international affairs, the more it seems like I'm chronicling someone's descent into madness.

So guess what the US military calls civilian casualties that result from their attacks? "Collateral Damages" was the old term.

Give up?

Answer: "Bugsplat"

"The Pentagon has a word for that, too," he went on. "They call it 'bugsplat.' In the opening days of the invasion of Iraq, they ran computer programs, and they called the program the Bugsplat program, estimating how many civilians they would kill with a given bombing raid. On the opening day, the printouts presented to General Tommy Franks indicated that 22 of the projected bombing attacks on Iraq would produce what they defined as heavy bugsplat — that is, more than 30 civilian deaths per raid. Franks said, 'Go ahead. We're doing all 22.'"

Note that this was the same Gen. Tommy Franks who declared that "we don't do bodycounts". 'Course not. You do bugsplats instead.

Guess those civilians killed by US drone attacks are just bugs too.

WTF happened to America, man?

 

 

Another year of sabre-rattling at Iran continues.

The year ended with Leon Panetta sabre rattling at Iran, though his aides quitely corrected the media reports which claimed that Panetta had said Iran was just months away from making nukes.

The US Senate also passed the Kirk-Menendez bill that would require the US to impose (secondary) sanctions on Iran's central bank. Note that the resolution passed unanimously - something that usually never happens in the Senate, not even when it comes to bills proposing totally benign and non-controversial things such as naming US Post Office stations. AIPAC of course celebrated the Senate's approval of the bill - probably because they had in fact drafted it in the first place. And Senator Kirk has been one of the largest recipients of AIPAC campaign donations. As Tom Friedman, a pro-Israel activist himself, pointed out, the US Congress has been essentially "bought and paid for" by pro-Israeli lobbyists.

And so by now it is clearer than ever that the US has never actually tried to engage Iran, has always sought ways to promote and justify a war, and the US system as a whole is simply functionally not able to stop the rush towards a conflict anymore.

This is around the same time that the Republican presidential debates are going on, displaying the most vulgar, ignorant jingoism seen on TV in a while - including statements by practically every candidate (except Ron Paul) trying to outdo each other in the sabre rattling at Iran. The irony here is that the proponents of attacking Iran are civilians whilst the opponents to a military attack on Iran are mostly from the US military and the experienced diplomats like Luers, Pickering and Walsh - but of course, no one listened to them 4 years ago either. And so MJ Rosenberg, himself a former AIPAC employee, predicts that the same crowd that gave us the Iraq invasion will continue to press for a military attack on Iran in the next year.

And today, Iran reported that it had manufactured its first nuclear fuel rod to power the medical reactor which is used to treat Iran's 800,000 cancer patients. The pundits are trying to downplay this, claiming that Iran could be 'exaggerating' but the reactor under question is under IAEA safeguards and so the matter will be clarified in the next IAEA report - the point here is that not so long ago the same pundits were declaring that since Iran could not possibly manufacture nuclear fuel rods, then its 20% enrichment must be for making nukes (nevermind that making nukes is much harder than making fuel rods.)

The next parliamentary elections in Iran are going to be next propaganda operation. Naturally the anti-Iran elements in the US will declare the elections to be fraudulent and tainted etc., regardless, because to say otherwise risks recognizing the legitimacy of the regime there. And if some elements in Iran decide to boycott the elections for their own reasons, they'll just be playing into this spin.

All in all, it doesn't appear that there's a prospect of any sort of breakthrough in US-Iran relations in 2012. The US policy making process, aside it being an election year which brings the nuts out of the woodwork, is fundamentally compromised by AIPAC lobbyists, the US president is too weak to stand up to them even if he wanted to, and so Israel continues to call the shots.

Meanwhile of course Israel itself is gradually turning into a failed state with a rising religious fascism and rife with growing internal dissent, and so the need for creating uniting foreign enemies is all the more pressing there. After all, it was Herzl who defined the nation of Israel as a group of people united by a common enemy, and both Iran and the Palestinians (who are now embracing HAMAS as well as garnering greater recognition as a country by the international community) serve that function quite well, so there won't be any particular rush to resolve those conflicts either.

And also watch for the growing Islamophobia in the West being fed by both ultra-right wing nationalists and pro-Israel activists, combined with the passage of new laws in the US that greatly expand the power of the government to violate what used to be considered sacrosanct constitutional rights such as a trial by jury. Fear, after all, is a great way to control people, and control is deemed to be necessary as the country faces increasing resentment at the massive and growing economic disparity that plagues the US. Once this resentment leads to action, it will be conveniently characterized as 'economic terrorism' thus turning dissent into crime.

Shirin Shafaei interview

UPDATE: Read the corrections noted in the comment below

I recommend reading this devastating interview with Shirin Shafaei which originally appeared in Iranicum and was translated by Iran Review - especially for the large collection of links.

To use a court case analogy, this is what has happened: Iran has been accused of having an intention to develop nuclear weapons (guilty until proven innocent), the Agency (prosecutor and the jury) cannot guarantee that Iran does not have a military nuclear agenda (double negative case), the enemy of Iran, Israel, itself very much guilty of having actually committed the same crime (nuclear weaponisation) provides the jury with the so-called evidence. Important documents and information were withheld from the jury (former IAEA head, ElBaradei) and the defendant (Iran). Meanwhile the new head of the jury (current IAEA head, Amano) is himself under the influence of another arch enemy of Iran and best friends of Israel, namely the US. The US is itself guilty of not only having the largest number of nuclear arsenal in the world throughout the history, but also guilty of being the only country which has actually used nuclear bombs against civilian population, not once but twice. When the jury-prosecutor receives these readymade allegations and fabricated evidence supporting those allegations, it sends Iran’s nuclear file to the Supreme Court which is the Security Council here. There again you find the US sitting comfortably along with its European allies and opportunist powers to decide if Iran should be punished for a crime it has not committed. It won’t be hard to guess what such a verdict would be, without even having seen or verified the evidence.

Is the "Protocols of the Elders of Zion" true?

Provocative title, eh? I am reproducing below a snippet of a conversation I had recently with a friend who is a PhD candidate, about his proposed thesis on the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, a fictional, fraudulent book published in Tsarist Russia which purports to expose a Jewish conspiracy to dominate the world.

Me: What happened when you proposed that as a thesis topic?

Friend: It was rejected, pretty fast. They warned me that publishing such a thesis would kill my academic career before it started; that I would never find someone to act as my thesis advisor; that the department would not accept it. In fact I was told - in so many words - that only Jews can write about the Protocols.

Me: Is it because they thought you would claim the Protocols were true?

Friend: Yeah, in part. There's still so much effort to "prove" that it fabricated and fictional--as if that's still an open question--but my point was that even as a work of fiction, it deserves some attention beyond simply proving it to be fabricated and false. Of course it is fictional, but so what? Orwell's 1984 was also fiction, and no one argues whether it is "true" or not - yet we still study it and analyze it and write about it as a piece of literature and political metaphor.

Me: So what were you going to write about the Protocols?

Friend: I was going to analyze it not as a historical document or a piece of journalism, but as metaphorical writing, just as 1984 is a political metaphor. But that wasn't allowed.

Me: Why?

Friend: Well, I think part of it is sensitivity to charges of promoting anti-semitism, because it is in fact an anti-semitic tract, even if you treat the work purely as a fabrication and fiction. But just because it is fiction doesn't mean it can't also be treated as a piece of literature. There is an undercurrent of Jewish exceptionalism and a sense of Jewish superiority in some corners - this isn't new and occasionally you hear about it in the news when some Rabbi issues some weird ruling for example. That sort of thing is true in Judaism as well as Islam and Christianity; this belief that your religion is not only destined to take over the world but also entitled to do so because it is superior. And recognition of the fact that such thought exists in Judaism makes a lot of people uncomfortable - so much so that even purely academic studies of the subject are entirely taboo, particularly by non-Jews.

Me: What interested you in this topic?

Friend: Well, ironically, initially I wanted to write about the prevalence and basis of Islamophobia in Western societies - something that has already attracted a lot of academic attention and controversy. But in studying the issue, I was struck by the similarity between today's expressions of Islamophobia, and the classic expressions of European anti-Semitism. If you substitute the word "Jew" for "Muslim" in classic anti-semitic literature, in most cases you'll end up with the exact same thing we hear today about Muslims: those swarthy, dirty, deceitful people are multiplying, lust for our blood, are intent on taking over the world, are secretly conspiring to subjugate the enlightened West to their backward religion, etc. These are classic expressions of anti-semitism, which are now applied to Islam. And ironically, some supporters of Israel have promoted this - this is why the pro-Israel Right has started to make common cause with the anti-Semitic Right in Europe like the BNP and EDL, and CUFI in the US, against the "Muslim threat."

Me: And pointing this out makes you anti-Semitic?

Friend: Yes, supposedly. The irony is that on one had the idea of Jewish Superiority is pretty well documented - we know the concept exists and is much debated. For example the idea that Jews are intellectually superior or Jewish Exceptionalism in intellectual arenas - which can just as easily be viewed as the Jewish "sneakiness" that anti-semites promote. There is a rich and long debate about Jewish Exceptionalism in the Jewish community. But it is a debate that is restricted to Jews. Non-Jews are not supposed to enter into it. If they do, people get uncomfortable and charges of anti-Semitism go flying.

Me: Do you think this issue has particular relevance nowdays?

Friend: Yes absolutely. I think much of the Right's world view, particularly the NeoCon and Pro-Israel Right, is informed by the sense of Jewish exceptionalism. I don't think there is a big debate about that, actually. Jeffrey Goldberg wrote about it. Philip Weiss writes about it. But they're both Jewish so they can do so.

I have to agree with this view btw - I think that Iran's real threat to Israel's "existence" is not in that Iran might decided to literally destroy Israel with a nuclear weapon, but as a threat to Israel's political and psychological identity, something Haggai Ram wrote about, and which Netanyahu even implicitly acknowledged when he said that a nuclear Iran would cause Jews to emigrate out of Israel, or when Danielle Pletka conceeds that the real "threat" posed by nuclear Iran would be if it becomes an accepted regional competitor